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Abstract
Abstract concepts typically are defined in terms of lacking physical or perceptual referents. We
argue instead that they are not devoid of perceptual information because knowledge of real-world
situations is an important component of learning and using many abstract concepts. Although the
relationship between perceptual information and abstract concepts is less straightforward than for
concrete concepts, situation-based perceptual knowledge is part of many abstract concepts. In
Experiment 1, participants made lexical decisions to abstract words that were preceded by related
and unrelated pictures of situations. For example, share was preceded by a picture of two girls
sharing a cob of corn. When pictures were presented for 500 ms, latencies did not differ. How-
ever, when pictures were presented for 1,000 ms, decision latencies were significantly shorter for
abstract words preceded by related versus unrelated pictures. Because the abstract concepts corre-
sponded to the pictured situation as a whole, rather than a single concrete object or entity, the nec-
essary relational processing takes time. In Experiment 2, on each trial, an abstract word was
presented for 250 ms, immediately followed by a picture. Participants indicated whether or not
the picture showed a normal situation. Decision latencies were significantly shorter for pictures
preceded by related versus unrelated abstract words. Our experiments provide evidence that
knowledge of events and situations is important for learning and using at least some types of
abstract concepts. That is, abstract concepts are grounded in situations, but in a more complex
manner than for concrete concepts. Although people’s understanding of abstract concepts certainly
includes knowledge gained from language describing situations and events for which those
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concepts are relevant, sensory and motor information experienced during real-life events is
important as well.
Keywords: Abstract concepts; Event knowledge; Situation knowledge; Picture-word processing;
Grounded cognition
1. Introduction
The informational bases underlying knowledge of abstract concepts such as idea or
freedom remain a theoretical challenge. One common observation is that abstract concepts
differ from concrete concepts such as chair or apple. In fact, they are often defined by
this difference, as being “entities that are neither purely physical nor spatially con-
strained” (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). Their lack of obvious physical or percep-
tual referents plays an important role in virtually all theories of the meaning of abstract
words. It has been shown that due to abstract concepts’ complexity, and also to the
heterogeneity of the large class of abstract concepts, how humans learn and use abstract
concepts depends on numerous types of information. Theories of abstract concepts have
focused on the importance of information such as emotion (Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson,
Andrews, & Del Campo, 2011; Kousta, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2009), linguistic co-occur-
rence (Anderson, Kiela, Clark, & Poesio, 2017; Louwerse & Connell, 2011; Louwerse &
Jeuniaux, 2010; Recchia & Jones, 2012), word association (Crutch & Warrington, 2010;
Paivio, 2007), social information (Borghi et al., 2017), and conceptual metaphors (Lakoff,
2014).
In this article, we investigated the hypothesis that knowledge of real-world situations is
an important component of abstract concepts. That is, we argue that abstract concepts are
not devoid of perceptual information because knowledge of real-world situations is an
important part of learning and using many abstract concepts. Although the relationship
between perceptual information and abstract concepts is not as straightforward as for con-
crete concepts, situation-based perceptual knowledge is part of many abstract concepts.
As Pecher, Boot, and Van Dantzig (2011) noted, the idea that situations are an important
aspect of abstract concepts is promising, but it has seldom been investigated. Further-
more, Borghi et al. (2017) noted that evidence for this view has come almost exclusively
from feature listing experiments. In two experiments, we tested whether the processing of
abstract concepts is influenced by situational information provided in the form of pictures
of situations.
A substantial amount of insight into, and debate about, the human conceptual system
has been provided by grounded (embodied) cognition theories (Barsalou, 2008; Borghi &
Pecher, 2011). Although there are several theoretical variants of this school of thought, a
common claim is that people understand concepts, to varying degrees, through modality-
specific brain regions (Barsalou, 2008; Chaterjee, 2010). Accordingly, concepts are not
comprised of amodal symbols but are represented, at least in part, in modality-specific
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brain regions that process perception and action. For example, people understand verbs
like kick via motor regions that are activated when this action is performed physically
(Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulverm€uller, 2004).
There exists substantial support for aspects of grounded cognition theories with respect to
concrete nouns and verbs, although the debate is ongoing (see, e.g., the 2016 special issue
of Psychonomic Bulletin & Review). Furthermore, the degree to which grounded approaches
provide insight into abstract concepts is not clear. Although grounded theories state that all
concepts, to some degree, are understood through modality-specific brain regions, it has
long been assumed that abstract concepts do not have modality-specific components. How-
ever, one way in which abstract concepts might be grounded is through being represented in
terms of complex relations among objects, people, places, and actions, as well as an individ-
ual’s internal states (introspection, thought, bodily sensations, mentalizing, emotions; Barsa-
lou, 2008). This information might be referred to in the aggregate as situational knowledge,
which includes relations among concepts that are physical and typically co-occur in situa-
tions that are experienced first-hand, or heard about, or read about.
1.1. Situations and abstract concepts
The situational-based view of abstract concepts highlights the fact that concepts do not
exist in a vacuum (Schwanenflugel, 1991). Because all concepts are part of an ongoing
situation or context, it is difficult to understand them independent of one’s situated expe-
rience. Although concrete concepts are relatively local in time and space, most abstract
concepts are not. However, this does not exclude abstract concepts from being learned
through real-world episodes. Instead, it suggests that their representation relies on com-
plex interactions that occur over space and time. Indeed, Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005)
conducted a feature listing task using abstract and concrete concepts. When participants
were asked to list item properties (their characteristics) or contextual properties (relevant
contexts), they produced a great deal of situational information for abstract concepts. That
is, people listed properties related to their experiences, particularly social contexts. In a
sense, participants used situations to define abstract concepts (see also Roversi, Borghi, &
Tummolini, 2013).
Because abstract concepts integrate components of situations that unfold over time,
their meaning is flexible and depends on context. To illustrate, consider the abstract con-
cept advice. Advice entails an agent, a patient, and a context that includes an exchange of
information. The precise meaning of advice depends on who is giving the advice (a
friend, a therapist, a lawyer, a parent), who is receiving it, and the context in which the
act occurs (a school, an office, a court, a kitchen). Although concrete objects typically
have situations as backgrounds (a loaf of bread in your kitchen, a restaurant, or the super-
market), many abstract concepts are aspects of the situation itself (Barrett, 2012). The
meaning of an abstract concept, then, is relatively vague when a single word is presented
out of context because of its reliance on people, objects, actions, and settings to constrain
its meaning (Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011). In other words,
although both concrete and abstract concepts individuate aspects of a situation to
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categorize the world around us in ways we can comprehend (Barsalou, 1999), the seman-
tics of a given abstract concept is impoverished in isolation and can change substantially
depending on context.
Recent research has begun to provide support for a situationally based view of abstract
concepts by demonstrating that they do, in fact, differ when presented as part of specific
contexts. Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2011) found that when observe was conceptualized
as part of a physical threat or social threat situation, activation profiles differed from
those reported in previous research, and more important, differed depending on context.
For the social threat situation, observe elicited more widespread activation in dorsal and
ventral visual processing areas, as well as auditory regions bilaterally, whereas activation
was much more constrained in the physical threat situation—with little overlap between
them. Wilson-Mendenhall et al. concluded that situated conceptualization is a basis of
abstract concepts. In addition, Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, and Barsalou
(2013) showed that the distributed neural patterns corresponding to the semantic informa-
tion that people retrieve when they deeply process an abstract concept are revealed only
when concepts are processed relative to a situational context.
Ghio and Tettamanti (2010) performed dynamic causal modeling using imaging data
from a study in which participants passively read action-related (“Now I push the button.”
or abstract sentences (“Now I appreciate the loyalty”). For action-related sentences, left-
hemisphere language areas were more functionally coupled with regions thought to sub-
serve action representation (LSMG, LpITG). For abstract sentences, left-hemisphere lan-
guage areas were more functionally coupled with areas thought to be involved in coding
contextual information and monitoring introspective states (areas in the retrosplenial cor-
tex). These results were interpreted as top-down, modality-specific reactivation of brain
areas that process the semantics of both concept types. Thus, regions that process intro-
spective states and contextual information (situational knowledge) may participate in rep-
resenting concepts like appreciate akin to how the motor system partially represents
action verbs like kick.
These studies provide support for a view in which situational information plays a role
in representing abstract concepts, although this idea still remains relatively unexplored.
As stated by Pecher et al. (2011, p. 232), “Words for abstract concepts might activate
specific, concrete situations that are instances of the concept or that provide a context for
the concept.” Theories that focus on the centrality of situational information lead to the
prediction that abstract concepts should be activated when situational information is pro-
vided, and that abstract concepts should activate situational knowledge. However, this has
not been demonstrated.
1.2. The present study
The remainder of the article begins with a norming study that was used to generate
stimuli for the subsequent two experiments. In Experiment 1, we tested whether pictures
depicting situations facilitate processing of abstract words. In Experiment 2, we tested
whether abstract words facilitate the processing of pictures depicting situations.
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To the best of our knowledge, only one prior study investigated facilitation between
pictures and abstract concepts. Vanderwart (1984) examined whether pictures of single
entities or objects provided as much facilitation as words using a lexical decision task.
For example, a picture of a lemon was used to prime the abstract concept “sour.” Both
picture and word primes facilitated abstract (and concrete) concepts. However, the picture
primes were images of isolated concrete entities or objects, such as “sour” being primed
by a picture of a lemon, or “time” being primed by a clock. In contrast, we tested
whether pictures of situations would facilitate, and/or be facilitated by, abstract concepts
such as “discipline” and “agreement.”
2. Norming study
The purpose was to create a set of picture–word pairs consisting of a picture depicting
a situation and a related abstract word.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Forty undergraduate students from the University of Western Ontario participated for a
chance to win $100. In all experiments reported herein, all participants were fluent in
English and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Participants took part in
only one of the studies described in this article. All studies were conducted in accordance
with the University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board Guidelines.
2.1.2. Materials
From Creative Commons, we selected 57 pictures depicting situations. We chose pic-
tures that we believed might elicit consistent responses from participants. Two pictures
are shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Pictures of situations related to “discipline” and “share.”
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2.1.3. Procedure
A survey was created and administered using Qualtrics. Participants were asked to pro-
vide two to five words related to each picture. They were instructed to avoid naming peo-
ple and objects, but rather to provide words summarizing the situation, or the emotions,
feelings, or thoughts of the people in the picture. In this way, we attempted to promote
the production of abstract concepts. Appendix A presents the instructions. The task was
self-paced, with all participants completing the task in <1 h.
2.2. Results
Each response was ranked according to the order in which it was provided. A
weighted score for each response was calculated as follows: Rank Sum
Score = 5a + 4b + 3c + 2d + e, where a, b, c, d, and e refer to the number of partici-
pants who provided that response in ranks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. For example,
given the leftmost picture in Fig. 1, “discipline” had a score of 74. Twelve participants
listed “discipline” first, two participants listed it second, and two listed it third. Morpho-
logical variants of a word were combined based on whichever form had the highest rank
sum score. For example, for one picture, different participants produced “bored” and
“boredom,” so these responses were combined as “bored” because its rank sum score was
higher.
The maximum possible rank sum score was 200 (40 participants times 5 if all partici-
pants provided the same word as their first response). For the 24 words that we selected
for Experiments 1 and 2, the scores varied between 42 and 158, with a mean of 88. Thus,
overall, it was not the case that participants were overwhelmingly producing the words
that we selected for Experiments 1 and 2 given the pictures. The chosen items were eli-
cited relatively consistently given the pictures, but the pictures brought other concepts to
mind as well, at least when participants were given time to think about it.
Concreteness scores were obtained from Brysbaert, Warriner, and Kuperman (2014),
who used a 1–5 scale, with 5 being most concrete. The 24 abstract words selected for
Experiments 1 and 2 had a mean concreteness score of 2.4 (SD = 0.4, range = 1.6–3.2).
Imageability was taken primarily from the MRC database, except for two words for
which we had collected imageability ratings as part of another project. The mean image-
ability rating was 443, and ratings ranged from 346 to 569.
3. Experiment 1
We investigated whether pictures corresponding to real-world situations would facilitate
responses to abstract concepts. It was hypothesized that participants might be faster to
respond to words denoting abstract concepts that were preceded by related situation-based
pictures, compared to those preceded by unrelated pictures. Pictures were presented either
for 500 or 1,000 ms. Consider the pictures in Fig. 1. The target words referred to relational
concepts corresponding to the picture as a whole, rather than a single depicted concrete
K. McRae et al. / Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (2018) 523
object, entity, or action. Therefore, it seemed highly likely that it might take time for par-
ticipants to perceive the entities, objects, actions, as well as the implied cognitions and
emotions, and the relations among them. Finally, although participants did produce these
abstract words reasonably consistently when instructed to do so in the norming study, it
certainly was possible that the pictures would not automatically activate abstract concepts.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Eighty undergraduate students from the University of Western Ontario participated for
course credit. There were 42 participants in the 500 ms picture duration condition and 38
in the 1,000 ms condition.
3.1.2. Materials
The target stimuli were 24 related picture–word pairs selected from the norming study.
Two lists were constructed, with each containing 12 related and 12 unrelated picture–
word pairs. Within the two item rotation groups, the related picture–word pairs were
shuffled among themselves to create unrelated pairings. Thus, the abstract words acted as
their own controls.
The same filler trials were used for both lists. There were 24 filler trials consisting of
situation-based pictures paired with unrelated abstract words. These produced a related-
ness proportion of .25 (12 related trials out of 48 trials for which the target was a word).
In addition, there were 48 trials consisting of situation-based pictures paired with pro-
nounceable non-words that were of similar length to the words used in this experiment
(e.g., “plumish”). Thus, the experiment consisted of 96 picture-letter string pairs, 50% of
which included words.
Finally, there were 16 practice trials to ensure that participants understood the task.
The practice trials were composed of the same proportions of trial types as in the experi-
mental trials.
3.1.3. Procedure
Picture-letter string pairs were presented using E-PRIME software v2.1 on a PC with a
15-inch color monitor with a refresh rate of 60 ms. Button presses were recorded using
Psychological Software Tools serial-response box (Model 200A), which provided mil-
lisecond accuracy. Participants used their dominant hand for “yes” responses (the letter
string is an English word) and their non-dominant hand for “no” responses (the letter
string is not an English word). The order of trials was randomized for each participant.
Each trial began with a fixation cross in the center of the screen for 200 ms. Immedi-
ately thereafter, a picture appeared for 500 or 1,000 ms, centered on the screen. A letter
string then appeared in 24 point Arial font in the center of the screen and remained until
the participant responded. The amount of time between the onset of the letter string and
the lexical decision response was recorded. Response accuracy was also recorded. The
intertrial interval was 1,500 ms.
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The experiment took less than 30 min. Upon completion, participants were thanked,
debriefed, and given course credit.
3.1.4. Design
Lexical decision latencies (ms) were analyzed using three-way mixed analyses of vari-
ance (ANOVA) by participants (F1) and items (F2). Relatedness was within-participants and
within-items, whereas picture duration was between-participants but within-items. List
(between-participants) and item rotation group (between-items) were used as dummy vari-
ables to minimize the variance due to the error associated with rotating participants and
items over the two lists (Pollatsek & Well, 1995).
3.2. Results and discussion
Decision latency analyses included only trials on which the response was correct. Deci-
sion latencies longer than three standard deviations above the grand mean were replaced
with that value (1.8% of the trials). Decision latencies for unrelated and related picture–
word pairs in each condition are presented in Table 1.
Across the two picture durations, lexical decision latencies were 10 ms shorter for
abstract words preceded by related (M = 549 ms, SE = 10 ms) as compared to unrelated
(559 ms, SE = 10 ms) pictures, F1 (1,76) = 4.49, p < .04, F2 (1,22) = 6.59, p < .02.
The interaction between picture duration and relatedness approached significance,
F1 (1,76) = 3.13, p < .09, F2 (1,22) = 4.06, p < .06. We conducted planned comparisons
to test the influence of relatedness separately at the two picture durations. When the picture
was presented for 500 ms, decision latencies were only 2 ms shorter for abstract words
preceded by related as compared to unrelated pictures, both F’s < 1. However, when the
picture was presented for 1,000 ms, decision latencies were 19 ms shorter for abstract
words preceded by related pictures, F1 (1,76) = 6.82, p < .02, F2 (1,44) = 9.91, p < .004.
Collapsed across related and unrelated items, decision latencies were 19 ms longer
when the picture was presented for 1,000 ms (M = 563 ms, SE = 14 ms) than when it
was presented for 500 ms (M = 544 ms, SE = 13 ms). This difference was significant by
items, F2 (1,22) = 15.34, p < . 002, but not by participants, F1 (1,76) = 1.02, p > .3.
Error analyses were not conducted because error rates were extremely low (<1% for both
picture durations).
Table 1
Mean lexical decision latencies (ms) for Experiment 1
Picture Duration (ms)
500 1,000
M SE M SE
Latencies
Unrelated 545 14 573 14
Related 543 13 554 14
Difference 2 19a
Note. aSignificant by participants and items.
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In Experiment 1, pictures of situations facilitated lexical decisions to abstract words.
The abstract words denoted concepts that depended on recognizing the concrete compo-
nents of the situations and the relations among them. Furthermore, the situations often
implied thoughts and emotions of depicted people. Because we anticipated that it might
take some time for this combinatorial processing to occur, the pictures were presented for
500 or 1,000 ms. Facilitation of related abstract concepts was obtained only when the
pictures were presented for 1-s. In real situations, of course, people are involved in them,
or are watching or hearing about them, for more than 1-s. In addition, the precise abstract
concepts that are most highly related to a dynamic event may change over time. How-
ever, despite the complex nature of relationships between situations/events and abstract
concepts, Experiment 1 showed that even static pictures can reliably activate abstract con-
cepts.
4. Experiment 2
We tested whether abstract words would influence the processing of pictures of situa-
tions. The same picture–word combinations were used as in Experiment 1. For each trial,
participants indicated whether or not “this picture shows a normal situation.” This task
encouraged participants to look at a picture as they normally would, which includes rec-
ognizing the depicted components and the relations among them. Therefore, half of the
trials were “no” trials in which an abstract word was followed by a picture that included
an oddity in the depicted situation (these were filler trials). We tested whether shorter
decision latencies for pictures would be obtained following related as compared to unre-
lated abstract words. For example, reading the abstract word “victory” might activate
knowledge that corresponds to a certain degree to triumphant-looking individuals. This
situation-based component of people’s knowledge of abstract concepts might then facili-
tate their response when viewing an image depicting such a scene, as opposed to the
image being preceded by an unrelated abstract word.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Forty-two undergraduate students from the University of Western Ontario participated
for course credit.
4.1.2. Materials
The target items were the same as in Experiment 1. The 24 word-picture pairs were
split into two rotation groups, each of which contained 12 related and 12 unrelated pairs.
Within rotation groups, the related word-picture pairs were shuffled to create the unre-
lated pairings. Therefore, pictures acted as their own controls. Two lists were generated
from the rotation groups, each consisting of the related word-picture pairs from one rota-
tion group and the unrelated word-picture pairs from the other.
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Twenty-four unrelated abstract word-picture filler trials were included. This produced a
relatedness proportion of .25 (12 related trials out of 48 trials for which the target was a
normal picture). Each of the 24 word-picture fillers was comprised of a situation-based
image preceded by an unrelated abstract concept. The same fillers were used in both word
lists.
An additional set of 48 pairs of abstract concepts and “incongruent” or “unusual”
images were used so that 50% of the trials contained normal images and 50% contained
incongruent images. The incongruent images were created using Adobe Photoshop CC
photo editing software. Images were edited such that each contained a relatively obvious
oddity and discrepancy from regular day-to-day situations. For example, one incongruent
image (Fig. 2) showed a woman pulling a violin from a fresh fruit aisle in a grocery
store. In total, the experiment consisted of 96 word-picture pairs.
Sixteen practice trials were included to allow the participants to become accustomed to
the task. The same proportions of trial types were used in the practice trials as in the
main experiment.
4.1.3. Procedure
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. For each trial, participants pressed
either the button indicating that “this picture shows a normal situation” with the index
finger of their dominant hand or the button indicating that “this picture shows an unusual
situation” with the index finger of their non-dominant hand. Each trial began with a fixa-
tion cross in the center of the screen for 200 ms, followed by the word, which appeared
for 250 ms. Immediately after the word disappeared, a picture appeared in its place until
the participant responded. The amount of time between the onset of the picture and the
response was recorded, as was response accuracy. The intertrial interval was 1,500 ms.
Fig. 2. Picture of an incongruent situation. This picture was paired with the abstract filler word “convocation.”
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The task took less than 30 min. Upon completion, participants were thanked, debriefed,
and given course credit.
4.1.4. Design
Picture decision latencies (ms) were analyzed using two-way mixed analyses of vari-
ance (ANOVA) by participants (F1) and items (F2). Relatedness was within-participants and
within-items. List (between-participants) and item rotation group (between-items) again
were used as dummy variables (Pollatsek & Well, 1995).
4.2. Results & discussion
Decision latency analyses included only the trials on which the response was correct.
Prior to analyses, decision latencies longer than three standard deviations above the grand
mean were replaced with that value (<1% of the trials). Four participants were excluded
from the analyses for having excessively high error rates. Decision latencies and error
rates for unrelated and related word-picture pairs are presented in Table 2.
Decision latencies were 82 ms shorter for pictures preceded by related as compared to
unrelated abstract words, F1 (1,36) = 6.28, p < .02, F2 (1,22) = 10.74, p < .004. The
square root of the number of errors was analyzed (Myers, 1979). Error rates were 3.3%
lower for related word-picture pairs, which was significant by items F2 (1,22) = 5.58,
p < .03, but not by participants F1 (1,36) = 1.44, p > .2.
If situations and events are an important part of learning and using abstract concepts,
then words referring to those concepts should activate generalized situation knowledge
that is relevant to them. Experiment 2 demonstrated that abstract words facilitated people’s
recognition of depicted situations that were exemplars of the types of situations that are
related to them. One thing to note about the results is that the picture decision latencies
were greater than 1-s, which is relatively long. This occurred presumably because partici-
pants had to recognize the components of each picture, and then decide whether the
depicted components constituted a normal situation. Thus, we infer that generalized situa-
tion knowledge is activated from abstract words relatively quickly, but we cannot
Table 2
Mean picture decision latencies (ms) for Experiment 2
M SE
Latencies (ms)
Unrelated 1247 74
Related 1165 63
Difference 82a
Percent errors
Unrelated 6.8 2.0
Related 3.5 0.9
Difference 3.3
Note. aSignificant by participants and items.
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definitively claim that it is activated absolutely immediately, for example, as the word
unfolds over time in speech.
5. General discussion
Other than in unusual conditions or in some cognitive psychology experiments, con-
cepts and the words denoting them are learned, comprehended, and produced in context.
That is, dogs, chairs, and apples are experienced as parts of events and situations. These
can be real-life events such as when we pet or walk a dog, or go into the fridge to choose
an apple to eat. The same can be said for linguistic experience. We encounter the words
dog or apple in discourse that often describes what a dog is doing or what someone is
doing with an apple. Thus, an important component of people’s conceptual knowledge
corresponding to dog and apple concerns the events and situations in which they occur.
Context, in terms of both real-life and linguistically described events and situations, is a
major force that shapes human concepts.
We argue that the same is true of abstract concepts, perhaps even to a greater degree.
People learn about abstract concepts such as risk, helpful, learn, accomplishment, and
creative to a large extent by being involved in and observing situations in which they are
relevant. Therefore, these situations or episodes shape our ability to comprehend and pro-
duce abstract concepts.
In Experiment 1, pictures of situations facilitated the processing of abstract words that
were related to those pictures. In Experiment 2, those words facilitated the processing of
depicted situations. Our results support arguments and data that have been provided by
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005), Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2011, 2013), and Roversi
et al. (2013). That is, it appears to be the case that at least some types of abstract concepts
are grounded in situations, but this is more complex than is the case for concrete
concepts (which is sufficiently complex in and of itself). Thus, learning and using abstract
concepts depends on a number of types of information that are relevant to events and situa-
tions. Real-world situations involve, and are understood through, relations among entities
(people to a great degree), objects, locations, time, emotions, and thoughts.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that the class of abstract concepts is large and
heterogeneous. Stating that one type of knowledge is the key to abstract concepts is
almost certainly wrong. Therefore, it is important to note that we are not claiming that
situational knowledge is the only factor that matters for learning and using all abstract
concepts. Furthermore, the idea that events and situations are important for abstract con-
cepts is not necessarily tied to grounded cognition in its strong forms. In addition to sen-
sory, motor, and affective information that is experienced during real-life events, people’s
understanding of abstract concepts certainly includes knowledge of other types. For
example, linguistic experience also is central because a great deal of our knowledge
comes from hearing or reading about events and situations. Language can importantly be
used to highlight specific types of information or components of situations, thus providing
knowledge that is relevant to many abstract concepts.
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Appendix A
Instructions for norming study
In this experiment, you will see several pictures. Your task is to view each picture then
provide 2 (minimum) – 5 (maximum) words you believe are related to the image by typ-
ing them in the space below you. Please report words in the order you deem most impor-
tant.
Please do not report objects, people, or physical actions depicted in the scenario.
For example, if the picture depicts a tree, do not report “tree.” Rather, we would like
you to focus on words that refer to emotions one might be feeling in the scenario, or
words that sum up the scenario as a whole.
Here is an example picture with good responses.
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1 exhausted
2 sleepy
3 tired
4 resting
5 break
Notice how we did not include words like, “girl,” “bench,” or “bicycle.”
Appendix B
Items used in the experiments
Target Ranked Sum Score Concreteness Imageability
accomplishment 56 2.50 413
agreement 54 2.22 367
anger 154 2.41 488
balance 110 2.89 429
bored 158 2.13 406
creative 72 1.93 404
danger 87 2.68 505
discipline 74 2.24 386
education 74 2.93 416
excitement 93 2.48 452
exhaustion 100 3.04 505
grief 70 2.70 480
health 55 2.28 432
helpful 61 1.76 346
joy 66 2.37 533
learn 72 2.20 361
love 127 2.07 569
relaxation 134 3.04 494
risk 62 1.63 405
share 132 2.96 471
surprise 120 3.24 451
thinking 68 1.96 384
thrill 42 2.46 483
victory 75 2.55 461
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